Adonis Hoffman</a> June 10, 2026 <p class="has-small-font-size"><em>(Views expressed by guest commentators may not reflect the views of OAN or its affiliates.)</em></p>" /> Adonis Hoffman</a> June 10, 2026 <p class="has-small-font-size"><em>(Views expressed by guest commentators may not reflect the views of OAN or its affiliates.)</em></p>" /> Adonis Hoffman</a> June 10, 2026 <p class="has-small-font-size"><em>(Views expressed by guest commentators may not reflect the views of OAN or its affiliates.)</em></p>" />
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ON CHINA, TRUMP HAS A POINT TO PROVE

BEIJING, CHINA - MAY 14: U.S. President Donald Trump (L) and Chinese President Xi Jinping participate in a welcoming ceremony at the Great Hall of the People on May 14, 2026 in Beijing, China. The trip by Trump is focused on trade, regional security, and strengthening bilateral ties between the world's two largest economies. (Photo by Kenny Holston-Pool/Getty Images)
BEIJING, CHINA – MAY 14: U.S. President Donald Trump (L) and Chinese President Xi Jinping participate in a welcoming ceremony at the Great Hall of the People on May 14, 2026 in Beijing, China. The trip by Trump is focused on trade, regional security, and strengthening bilateral ties between the world’s two largest economies. (Photo by Kenny Holston-Pool/Getty Images)

Commentary by: Adonis Hoffman 
Wednesday, June 10, 2026

The U.S.- China relationship is, by any measure, one of the most consequential and complicated economic partnerships in modern history. It is also a relationship increasingly defined by asymmetric values, vision, and volume amid a growing list of strategic tensions.

The numbers alone are compelling. China remains one of America’s largest trading partners, now third behind Mexico and Canada, and a top-three export market and source of imports, altogether generating some $582 billion in annual trade. American consumers benefit daily from lower-cost Chinese goods, from apparel to electronics to household products. American farmers, especially soybean, corn, and pork producers, depend heavily on Chinese demand. Mom-and-pop stores, retail merchants, and online entrepreneurs rely on Chinese suppliers for their economic lifeline. And U.S. multinationals from Apple to General Motors have built big parts of their global operations around Chinese manufacturing and consumers.

This interdependence is both unique and unsettling. Even if the two nations were to uncouple economically as some suggest, it would cost American households an estimated $1,500 a year or more in higher consumer prices, according to the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

But economic engagement has limits that are clearly defined by U.S. national security through a complex system of restrictions on Chinese companies and sensitive technologies. The Department of Defense’s Section 1260H list identifies firms with ties to the People’s Liberation Army; the FCC’s Covered List, and its “rip and replace” program, bars Huawei, ZTE, Hikvision, Dahua, and Hytera from U.S. telecom infrastructure and federal subsidies. The CHIPS and Science Act, along with successive Commerce Department rules have sharply restricted the flow of advanced chips and chip-making equipment to China, forcing companies like NVIDIA, Intel, and ASML to restructure. Forged by successive administrations, these restrictions reflect a bipartisan consensus and a new commercial reality. Trade policy, technology policy, and national security are no longer separate lanes. They now intersect in corporate boardrooms.

 

Meanwhile, China has blocked foreign companies from its market despite commitments made under WTO accession over twenty years ago, and Beijing’s state-subsidy model helps Chinese companies compete at prices no market-based enterprise can sustainably match.

Throughout our recent history, China has been a formidable foe, a fair-weather friend, and everything in between. When President Trump visited China last month, he opened a new chapter, one markedly different from what came before. Like most foreign policy today, he has made U.S.- China relations very personal, referencing many conversations and warm relationship with President Xi, even as he issues stern warnings about the Chinese threat to key American interests.

But Congress and the Executive Branch do not always see eye to eye. Congressional leaders tend to frame China policy through sanctions, restrictions, and national security. This President emphasizes technology controls, tariffs, market access, leverage, and direct negotiation. His method has been unconventional and decidedly un-Washington, but the results suggest he has a point that could result in bigger and more balanced deals, mutual commercial respect, and deeper market penetration for American companies, while protecting national security in vulnerable sectors.

 

The comfortable conventional wisdom in Washington held that bringing China into the global economy would somehow moderate its more troubling business practices. But market reality over time has disproved that view. China has played almost every angle, taking a mile whenever an inch was given, at the same time shielding its own markets from meaningful American participation. China, the Administration rightly argues, is not just a tough trading partner with an unbalanced ledger; it is a strategic competitor that uses trade, technology, capital, and military might to advance its interests. Navigating that reality requires engaging Beijing from a position of strength rather than subordination, even at the risk of short-term pain.

As America re-examines its priorities, it is fair to note that the Trump Administration has gotten several key things right on China. It used tariffs as successful diplomatic leverage, where the softer approach produced process without results. The pressure culminated in the October 2025 Busan summit, where sustained leverage forced firm Chinese commitments on fentanyl, rare earths, and agricultural purchases.

Trump also elevated non-traditional threats to the national-security level. He brought fentanyl to the negotiating table, securing a commitment from China to halt precursor shipments, and identified TikTok as a data and influence threat, laying the groundwork for the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, which the Supreme Court upheld in January 2025.

 

He identified supply chains, rare earths, and semiconductors as critical. The 2025 Busan agreement forced Beijing to suspend the sweeping rare-earth export controls it had imposed only weeks earlier. And the 2019 restriction on Huawei via the Commerce Department’s Entity List established the precedent that advanced chips are foundations of military power and artificial intelligence, not ordinary exports.

The Administration became more realistic about next-generation industries. Recognizing that Chinese electric vehicles are software-driven data platforms, it advanced to a 100 percent tariff and finalized connected-vehicle rules banning compromised software by model year 2027. This Administration has maintained those measures and hardened them with a new 25 percent national-security tariff on imported vehicles in 2025. A Section 301 investigation into China’s maritime and shipbuilding dominance secured a one-year suspension of responsive actions in November 2025, proof that controlling trade channels means controlling leverage.

And then there is Taiwan. Disregarding critics who claimed that arming Taipei would provoke Beijing, the Administration backed a historic $11.1 billion arms package in December 2025, the largest ever, featuring HIMARS, Javelins, and drones. Beijing condemned it as a breach of the one-China principle, but the sale went ahead.

 

The U.S. can no longer view China as a collection of separate issues. Trade, technology, Taiwan, TikTok, rare earths, and supply chains are all fundamentally connected. Beijing always treated them as a unified strategy; Washington historically did not. Old assumptions wrongly predicted that engagement would make China more open, reciprocal, and restrained. Instead, Beijing took advantage of access to American markets and capital to strengthen its own hand while actively resisting global rules.

Trump was the first American president to visit China in nearly a decade, and he has invited Xi to Washington in September. That summit will not be resolved by banquets, ceremony, and communiqués alone, but it offers a vital chance to stress-test the Administration’s approach of leverage and deterrence against big-dollar deals and durable outcomes. There are already concrete signs: during the Beijing visit, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced that the two countries are discussing a “Board of Investment” to fast-track Chinese investment in non-sensitive American sectors before deals ever reach CFIUS review, along with a companion “Board of Trade” to manage the commercial relationship at the highest levels.

China and the U.S. need not agree on governance, individual rights, or the rule of law to conduct productive commerce, but they cannot pretend the differences away, least of all on Taiwan. Where cooperation remains possible, on climate, financial regulation, and fentanyl enforcement, it should be pursued; where it does not, America’s interests in fair trade and security come first.

Foreign-policy experts may not credit the President’s pivot, because it flies in the face of convention. But it has largely worked, and it deserves its due for right-sizing the trade imbalance. China remains both competitor and co-partner, and American industries must now compete harder in the sectors where Chinese firms dominate, from drones and sensors to routers, EV batteries, biotech, AI, and industrial equipment.

The September summit in Washington will not settle the larger contest, and it would be unwise to expect that of any single meeting. What it can do is confirm a shift that has already taken hold.

For a generation, the conventional wisdom held that access to the Chinese market was itself a strategy, and that engagement would, in time, make Beijing more open, more reciprocal, more restrained. It did nothing of the kind. China approached trade, technology, capital, Taiwan, and much else as a single, connected enterprise, even as Washington treated each as a matter for a different agency on a different track.

The Trump approach, whatever one makes of its style, has been to treat the relationship as one negotiation and to conduct it from leverage. The commitments now taking shape, on rare earths, fentanyl, tariffs, and investment, are the measure of that method, and it is fair to say that decades of patient engagement produced no such movement. The President has not confused commerce with strategy, nor market access with entitlement, and he has put to rest the convenient assumption that our chief competitor was playing by the rules.

By any fair reading on U.S. – China relations, Trump has been right all along.

(Views expressed by guest commentators may not reflect the views of OAN or its affiliates.)


Adonis Hoffman writes on business, law, and policy. He served in senior legal roles at the FCC and in the U.S. House of Representatives where he was counsel to the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

 

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